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TAX COMMENT
"The provision in the Fourteenth Amendment that no
State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, was not intended to ,prevent a State
from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and rea-
sonable ways. * * * It may impose different specific taxes
upon different trades and professions and may vary the rates
of excise upon various products; it may tax real estate and
personal property in a different manner. * * * All such regu-
lations and those of like character, so long as they proceed
within reasonable limits and general usage are within the dis-
cretion of the State Legislature. * * * We think we are safe
in saying that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended
to compel the State to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation."
It is therefore submitted that the dissenting opinion is logically
correct and practical in operation for the following reasons:
1. The nature of the tax in question is one on the re-
ceipts of a business, and is not a tax on property, regardless
of the name assigned to it. A tax statute is not to be con-
demned because of the name. If a tax of the net receipts
of one form of business is invalid because a similar tax is not
levied on other kinds of business it would mean that the busi-
ness receipts of one form of business could not be taxed unless
a tax was imposed on every kind of business. Certainly, this
was not within the contemplation of the statute in question.
2. The tax levied against the casualty receipts of foreign
fire insurance companies in Illinois was reasonable, since their
casualty business formed only a small part of their operations.
Foreign fire insurance companies in that state were in a class
different from those companies that did a casualty business
only. If this tax measure is held invalid the ultimate result
would be that few businesses would escape taxation, although
justified in being exempted.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment does not compel a state
to adopt an "iron rule of taxation." There was no abuse of
discretion in the tax on receipts of casualty business done by
foreign fire insurance companies in Illinois, and the tax should
have been declared valid.
IRVING WEINSTEIN.
INCOME TAx-CONSOLIDATED CORPORATION'S LIABILITY FOR
TAx INCURRED BY CONSTITUENT CORPORATION.-The Oswego Falls
Pulp & Paper Company was a constituent corporation to a consolida-
tion of the taxpayer (Oswego Falls Corporation) with itself on
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January 30, 1922, pursuant to Section 7 of the Business Corporation
Law of New York. In 1925 the constituent corporation, through
its president and under its corporate seal, executed waivers of the
Statute of Limitations for the years 1917-1920. The taxpayer exe-
cuted a waiver for the year 1921 as successor by consolidation; and
for the year 1919 as transferee of the constituent corporation. Notices
of assessment for the years 1917-1921 were sent to the taxpayer
(consolidated corporation) advising it of its liability as transferee of
the Oswego Falls Pulp & Paper Company. The Commissioner seeks
to hold the defendant taxpayer liable as transferee, alleging that the
notice of assessment is valid. Held, the constituent corporation could
not execute a waiver, the taxpayer is not a transferee, the notice of
assessment is valid; and therefore the taxpayer is liable only for the
year 1921. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Oswego Falls
Corporation, 71 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
- The taxpayer was consolidated under the authority of New
York State ' and therefore the legislature of that state fixes the effect
of such consolidation.2 The constituent corporation, after consoli-
dation, is for all purposes extinguished. 3 But the termination of a
corporation may not impair a creditor's rights ; 4 and where the dis-
solved corporation has distributed its assets to the stockholders, the
Commissioner may proceed against the stockholders as transferees 6
under the statute.6 Under such circumstances the president of the
dissolved corporation may execute a waiver of the Statute of
Limitations. 7
A consolidated corporation is vested with the rights of the con-
'N. Y. STocK CoRp. LAW §86 (Cons. Laws, c. 59), formerly N. Y.
BusINEss CORP. LAW §7 (Cons. Laws, c. 4).
'Matter of Bergdorf, 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912). In speaking of
the statutory merger provisions which were similar to the consolidation provi-
sions, the court said, "It would not have taken place. without statutory authority
and the legislature fixed the indisputable and exclusive effect of it."
'Miner v. New York, C. & H. R R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 242, 25 N. E. 339
(1890) (The corporate life came to an end at the time of the consolidation) ;
Irvine v. New York Edison Co., 207 N. Y. 425, 101 N. E. 358 (1913) (The
constituent corporation became rightless, powerless, and propertyless).
I Guarantee Trust Co. of New York v. New York & Queens County Ry.
Co., 253 N. Y. 190, 170 N. E. 887 (1930) (It continues to exist in so far as its
existence is necessary for the protection of its creditors).
Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 51 Sup. Ct.
608 (1930).
86 Rv. Acr oF 1926 §280, 44 Stat. 9, 61, 26 U. S. C. A. §1069.
" Wonder Bakeries Co., Inc. v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 228 (Ct. Cl.
1934).
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stituent corporation, s and assumes its contract and tort liability 9
as though it had itself incurred it,'0 but iwt as transferee or assignee.'
The consolidated corporation must be substituted for the constituent
corporation if the action had not been commenced prior to consoli-
dation.'2 The creditor's rights are unimpaired and preserved.13
Where the statute does not provide for an assumption of liabilities,
as in the case of a transfer, the funds of the debtor corporation con-
stitute a trust in the hands of the transferee which the creditor may
reach.' 4  But the creditor may proceed equitably against the trans-
feree only when he has exhausted his remedies against the trans-
ferror,'r unless otherwise provided by statute,16 or where such action
would be futile.i 7 The federal courts will enforce the remedy exist-
ing in the state courts when the facts which confer federal jurisdic-
8N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW §89 (Cons. Laws, c. 59), formerly N. Y. Busi-
NESS CORP. LAW §11 (Cons. Laws, c. 4). "Upon the filing of such certificate
of consolidation * * * all the rights, privileges, franchises and interests of each
of the constituent corporations, and all the property, real, personal and mixed,
and all the debts due on whatever account to either of them, * * * shall be
taken and deemed to be transferred to and vested in such new corporation,
without further act or deed, * * *." Miner v. New York, C. & H. R. R. R.
Co., supra note 3; ef. Matter of Bergdorf, supra note 2; Citizens Savings &
Trust Co. v. Cincinnati D. Traction Co., 106 Ohio 577, 140 N. E. 380 (1922)
(under statute similar to that of New York).
" Polhemus v. Fitchberg R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 502, 26 N. E. 31 (1890);
Lee v. Stillwater & Mechanicville Street Ry. Co., 140 App. Div. 779, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 840 (3d Dept. 1910); American Railway Express Co. v. Commonwealth,
190 Ky. 636, 228 S. W. 433 (1921) (under statute providing regulations similar
to those of New York).
" N. Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW §90 (Cons. Laws, c. 59), formerly N. Y.
BUSINESS CoRP. LAW §§11 and 12 (Cons. Laws, c. 4) (context is materially
unaltered). "The rights of creditors of any corporation that shall be consoli-
dated shall not in any manner be impaired, * * * but such new corporation
shall be deemed to have assumed and shall be liable for all liabilities and
obligations of each of the corporations consolidated in the same manner as if
such new corporation had itself incurred such liabilities or obligations. * * *"
Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 33 F. (2d)
695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); West Texas Refining & Developing Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 68 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933).
n Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. United States, 256 U. S. 655, 41 Sup. Ct.
611 (1921). The court held that the statute prohibiting a transferee or
assignee from prosecuting a claim against the United States did not apply to
a consolidated corporation which was enforcing a claim of its constituent
corporation.
" Lee v. Stillwater & Mechanicville Street Ry. Co., supra note 9.
'In the Matter of The Utica National Brewing Co., 154 N. Y. 268, 48 N.
E. 521 (1897); Wilson v. Mechanical Orguinette Co., 170 N. Y. 542, 63 N. E.
550 (1902).
1' Campbell v. Dick, 71 Okla. 186, 176 Pac. 520 (1918).
25Ozan Lumber Co. v. Davis Sewing Machine Co., 284 Fed. 161 (D. Del.
1922) ; Irvine v. New York Edison Co., supra Vote 3. A creditor seeking the
equitable assets of a debtor must produce an unsatisfied judgment.
2Baumgartner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 51 F. (2d) 472 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1931).
" Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., Inc., 50 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
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tion exist. 8  It is obvious that a taxpayer and transferee cannot
co-exist, as such status would presuppose two juristic persons, one
being primarily liable and the latter secondarily liable.19
Generally where a waiver purports to be executed for a dis-
solved corporation it is ineffective, 20 unless such power is given by
statute of the state of incorporation. 21  But the court will look at
the substance rather than the form of the transaction, 22 and it has
held that a waiver signed by the traisferee acting for the dissolved
traiisferror was valid 2 3 although the Statute of Limitations had ex-
pired; 24 though in the instant case the court strictly construed the
waiver.25  And so the court has held that a notice of assessment
naming the party as "taxpayer" instead of "transferee" was valid 26
and that such notice need not be signed by the Commissioner 27 nor
have any definite or special form.28
I. D.
TAXATION-GAIN OR Loss ON SECURITIEs HELD IN MARGIN
AccouNT.-Early in 1926, petitioner purchased on marginal account
a block of United Gas Improvement Company stock. In 1928, he
purchased additional stock of the same company and in subsequent
transactions he sold an amount equal to the number of shares he
" Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Weld County,
Colorado, 222 Fed. 651 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915).
19 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 68
F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Newport Co., 65 F. (2d) 925 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1933), rev'd on other grounds, 291 U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct. 481 (1934) ;
cf. Wonder Bakeries Co., Inc. v. United States, supra note 7. "There is a
conflict in the decisions as to whether an officer and stockholders of a dissolved
corporation can file a waiver for it under any circumstances," but such a party
can file a waiver for the dissolved corporation that would be binding on
himself. Instant case.
' Helvering v. South Penn Oil Co., 68 F. (2d) 420 (App. D. C. 1933).
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic & Com-
merce Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490, 38 Sup. Ct. 553 (1918).
'Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U. S. -, 54 Sup. Ct. 481 (1934). The
court, without discussion, dismisses the contra proposition as without merit.
' Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wolf Co., 69 F. (2d) 1001 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1934).
'The court ruled that all waivers, except the one for the year 1921, were
ineffective, and thus, it of necessity included the waiver executed by the
taxpayer as "transferee."
' Burnet v. San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co., 52 F. (2d) 123 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931). But in this case the liability of the transferee was that of a
taxpayer.
'Riggs v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 50 F. (2d) 1082 (C. C. A.
3d, 1931); Helvering v. Continental Oil Co., 68 F. (2d) 750 (App. D. C.
1933).
1 Tameling v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 F. (2d) 814 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1930) ; Noyes v. United States, 55 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932);
Ventura Consolidated Oil Fields v. Welch, 6 F. Supp. 327 (S. D. Cal. 1934).
